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Abstract: In this paper we examine 
two challenges to the orthodox un-
derstanding of the fallacy of denying 
the antecedent. One challenge is to 
say that passages thought to express 
the fallacy can usually be given an 
interpretation on which they express 
valid arguments, entitling us to que-
ry whether the fallacy is commonly, 
if ever, committed at all. We discuss 
this claim in Section 1. The second 
challenge comes from those who 
think that there are legitimate uses of 
denying the antecedent that have 
traditionally been overlooked. In 
Section 2 we propose a general test 
for claims of this sort, and assess 
three versions of this view. 
 
Résumé: Dans cet article, nous 
examinons deux défis à la compré-
hension orthodoxe du sophisme de 
nier l'antécédent. Un défi consiste à 
dire que généralement notre inter-
prétation d’un passage que nous ju-
geons fallacieux peut nous donner 
un argument valide, ce qui nous 
donne le droit de nous demander si 
l'erreur est commise souvent, si ja-
mais du tout. Nous discutons cette 
allégation dans la section 1. Le deu-
xième défi vient de ceux qui affir-
ment qu'il y a des usages légitimes 
de nier l'antécédent qui ont tradi-
tionnellement été négligés. Dans la 
section 2, nous vous proposons un 
test général pour les affirmations de 
ce genre, et évaluons trois versions 
de ce point de vue. 
 
Keywords: affirming the consequent; argument reconstruction; charity; 
denying the antecedent; fallacies 
 
 
There is a moralistic argument for belief in God, which 
was popularized by William James. According to this ar-
gument, we ought to believe in God because, if we do 
not, we shall not behave well . . . It is, in the first place, 
very doubtful whether belief in God has all the beneficial 
moral effects that are attributed to it. Many of the best 
men known to history have been unbelievers. John Stuart 
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Mill may serve as an instance. And many of the worst 
men known to history have been believers. Of this there 
are innumerable instances. Perhaps Henry VIII may serve 
as typical.   (Bertrand Russell, 1997/1952, p. 545-6.) 
 
 
1.  The fallacy that never was? 
 
In a 1994 article, Michael Burke sought to defend the view that 
the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent is rarely if ever 
committed, at least “among arguers sufficiently mature to have 
published writings” (Burke 1994, p. 27). He was neither the first 
nor the last to argue for a claim of this kind (cf. the discussion 
and references in Finocchiaro 1981; Adler 1994; Krabbe 1995; 
Moldovan 2009), but his remains the most sustained and best 
known defence of this position. It will form the focus of our dis-
cussion in this section. 
Burke takes himself to have offered reasons of varying 
strength to support two claims. One is that “the fallacy of deny-
ing the antecedent is not common in published writings”; the 
other, that “published passages cannot often be charged with 
denying the antecedent” (1994, p. 27). We will argue both that 
Burke has failed to provide us with adequate reasons to warrant 
these claims, and that there is reason to think that the claims are 
false. 
Burke’s argument is premised upon a “principle of fair-
ness”, which he styles a “very weak principle of exegetical char-
ity”: that we should not prefer a fallacious to a non-fallacious 
interpretation of an argument “unless the balance of textual, 
contextual, and other evidence” favours such an interpretation 
(p. 24). This seemingly plausible condition poses an obstacle 
“so serious”, Burke says, “that I know of no real argument that 
can justifiably be charged with denying the antecedent” (p. 23). 
The reason is that it will almost always be possible to offer an 
alternative and at least equally plausible interpretation on which 
the argument does not come across as fallacious. 
In order to illustrate this point, Burke examines passages 
commonly offered in textbooks as examples of the fallacy. 
Some of these examples are “concocted”, while some are “real”; 
but Burke proposes to regard them all “as real utterances”, and 
claims that such passages “cannot be fairly charged with the fal-
lacy of denying the antecedent”. The example he discusses in 
greater detail is one of the “concocted” ones: 
 
If capital punishment deterred murder, it would be justi-
fied. Since it doesn’t, it isn’t. 
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Burke remarks that it is “at least plausible . . . to take the argu-
ment to be an enthymematic instance of modus ponens (or of 
modus tollens, depending on the formulation of the unstated 
conditional)” (p. 24). That is because there is “no adequate rea-
son” to consider the speaker’s stated conditional “as part of the 
argument”; after all, “it is anything but unusual for a passage 
containing an argument to contain statements that are not part of 
the argument” (p. 24). In this example, “it is at least plausible to 
ascribe to the conditional some other role”—the rhetorically and 
dialectically important role of “clarifying the nature of the argu-
er’s objection to capital punishment, of making clear that the 
arguer opposes capital punishment only because the arguer be-
lieves it doesn’t deter murder”. We can accordingly view the 
speaker’s argument as containing only one stated premise—the 
premise that capital punishment does not deter murder—
together with the “unstated premise: If capital punishment 
doesn’t deter murder, then it isn’t justified” (p. 25). But then the 
argument is valid: it is an instance of modus ponens. 
This is not an isolated example: the point is meant to hold 
for all the passages found in textbooks as illustrating the fallacy 
of denying the antecedent, and indeed more generally. The fair-
ness constraint, Burke says (p. 26), “is satisfied in none of the 
examples we have considered—and in none of which I am 
aware”: 
 
It would be unfair to view them as formally fallacious unless 
there were some special reason for doing so. And in none of 
the cases known to me does either the context of the passage 
or any other salient circumstance supply such a reason (p. 
27). 
 
In every actual example Burke considers, then, the stated condi-
tional can invariably be understood, “naturally and plausibly”, 
as playing some “non-premisory” role; and unstated premises 
(and sometimes unstated conclusions) can be identified, war-
ranting—in the absence of “contextual or circumstantial evi-
dence” to the contrary—the interpretation on which the argu-
ment is not formally fallacious (p. 25). 
We agree that the textbook examples examined by Burke 
would—if taken as examples of actual arguments—be better 
understood as formally valid arguments rather than as instances 
of denying the antecedent.1 How, then, can we disagree with his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It does not follow that we agree that “concocted” examples like the capital 
punishment one, when found in textbooks, are necessarily poor examples of 
denying the antecedent. Being concoctions, these examples are presumably 
being offered by textbook authors as depicting situations in which someone 
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conclusion? Surely, if textbook examples—presumably chosen 
precisely because they are exemplary—cannot be justifiably 
charged with instantiating the fallacy, do we not have good 
grounds to suppose that this will be true of most, if not all, pub-
lished arguments?  
Burke himself asks the key question: “Are [these] examples 
. . . in some way unrepresentative” (p. 26)? The basis for our 
disagreement is that we have no reason to think that they are 
representative, and some reason to think that they are not. 
The first step is to examine the reason Burke gives for 
thinking that the examples are indeed representative. He begins 
by noting that “the fallacy of denying the antecedent is instanti-
able by passages of many different patterns”, and proposes that 
we split these into two groups: those (which he calls “B pat-
terns”) that “contain a textual feature indicating . . . that the con-
ditional contained by the passage is a premise and that the pas-
sage, therefore, is an instance of denying the antecedent”; and 
those (the “A patterns”) in which there is no such textual indica-
tion. He goes on to give some examples of both (p. 26): 
 
A Patterns (relatively com-
mon) 
B Patterns (uncommon) 
(a)  If A, then B. Not A. So, 
not B. 
(b)  If A, then B. But not A. 
So, not B. 
(c)  If A, then B. Since not A, 
not B. 
(d)  If A, then B. But since 
not A, not B. 
(e)  Not A. If A, then B. So, 
not B. 
(f)  If A, then B. And not A. 
So, not B. 
(g)  Not A. Since B if A, not 
B. 
(h)  If A, then B. And since 
not A, not B. 
(i)   Not A. But if A, then B. 
So, not B. 
(j)  Not A. But since B if A, 
not B. 
(k)  Not B, since not A. And if 
A, then B. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
does actually mean to combine a conditional and the denial of the antecedent 
to infer the denial of the consequent. This is not to say that the examples are 
plausible, or that such situations are frequent. Yet surely it is the prerogative 
of those authors to cook up wholly imaginary situations that illustrate pre-
cisely what they mean them to illustrate. These are, after all, their exam-
ples—not Burke’s. So Burke can only say that in these examples there is “no 
reason” to regard the conditionals as premises, or that there is “no evidence” 
supporting the fallacy charge, by filling up those authors’ examples with de-
tails that no longer allow them to stand as plausible illustrations of the fallacy 
of denying the antecedent; and to do that is to change rather than to “inter-
pret” such examples. 
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B Patterns (uncommon)  
 
(l) Not B, since B if A. And 
not A. 
(m) If A, then B. So not B, 
since not A. 
Burke’s argument from here is simple. Passages that instantiate 
A patterns are relatively common, but fairness almost always 
requires that we interpret them as formally valid arguments. Ar-
gumentative passages that instantiate B patterns, on the other 
hand, are “almost surely” (p. 26) to be interpreted as falla-
cious—because the text makes it clear that the explicit condi-
tional is indeed a premise of the argument—but we rarely, if ev-
er, find them, and their instantiations sound “unnatural”. This 
provides us, Burke says, with good reason to think that “pub-
lished passages cannot often be charged with denying the ante-
cedent” (p. 27). 
This argument, however, seems to us incapable of support-
ing its conclusion—and for considerations that have nothing to 
do with the small size of the sample with which Burke is work-
ing. (“In examining 81 books, as well as numerous articles on 
fallacies”, Burke “found 9 real passages said to be instances of 
denying the antecedent”, none of which instantiates a B pattern: 
p. 27.) In order to explain why, it will help to be clearer about 
what it means to “commit” the fallacy of denying the anteced-
ent, and about the role played by “patterns” in identifying it.  
An arguer commits, with regard to a certain conclusion, the 
fallacy of denying the antecedent, when her argument for that 
conclusion can be justifiably reconstructed as a materially inva-
lid instance of one of the following patterns: 
 
Denying the antecedent: propositional form 
(denying the antecedent stricto sensu)  
 (1) If p, then q. 
 (2) It is not the case that p. 
   Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
 (3) It is not the case that q. 
 
Denying the antecedent: universal form 
 (1) For every x: if x is S, then x is P. 
 (2) It is not the case that a is S. 
   Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
 (3) It is not the case that a is P. 
 
These can be used as patterns of representation: as templates 
under which the components of the reconstructed argument can 
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all be made explicit and clearly displayed. But there is no reason 
to think that when a writer or speaker does give an argument 
that can be charitably reconstructed as an instance of one of the-
se patterns, her actual utterances—her text or spoken words—
will display a grammatical form that is anything like any of the 
two patterns. In particular, in order for a conditional premise 
like (1) to be charitably attributed to an arguer, what is required 
is that she can be taken to be presenting p (or the claim that a is 
S) as a sufficient condition of q (or of the claim that a is P)—
however that is actually articulated by her. Burke’s argument is 
predicated upon the assumption that any argument that can even 
be considered a candidate for instantiating the fallacy of denying 
the antecedent will have been put forth in a passage that contains 
an explicit grammatical conditional in the “If . . . then . . .” form; 
but that assumption seems to be false. 
To say that an arguer commits the fallacy of denying the an-
tecedent is to say that she is committed to the claim that the ne-
gation of a sufficient condition is sufficient for the negation of 
that which was so conditioned. That is a logical error, and one 
reason that we reconstruct and represent arguments in the man-
ner that we do—with patterns like the ones above—is to bring 
out this error as clearly as possible.2 But there is no limit on the 
ways in which the arguer’s logical error could be expressed by 
her, and no reason at all to suppose that her utterances will have 
to conform to a particular grammatical pattern. Our point, to be 
clear, is not that we are entitled to “read in” a commitment to a 
conditional in the absence of strong textual support for such an 
attribution. Our point is merely that there are many different 
ways in which an arguer can make it textually clear that she is 
committed to a conditional proposition—a proposition that we 
can properly understand and render as an “If . . ., then . . .” 
claim—that do not involve the actual expression by the arguer 
of a grammatical “If . . ., then . . .” sentence. 
Here is a simple illustration. Suppose someone charged 
Burke with committing in his paper the fallacy of denying the 
antecedent, attributing to him the following argument: 
 
(1) If instances of the listed B patterns were common in 
  published writings, we would have reason to think 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Reconstruction as a denial of the antecedent is only one way of bringing out 
this flaw. There will be others: by restating the conditional premise as its 
logically equivalent contrapositive, for example, an argument that can be 
charitably reconstructed as a denial of the antecedent can also be charitably 
reconstructed as an example of the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent 
(although there may be reasons other than charity for preferring one recon-
struction over the other). 
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  that the fallacy of denying the antecedent can often 
  be justi fiably charged. 
(2) Instances of the listed B patterns are not common in 
  published writings. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) We have no reason to think that the fallacy of denying 
  the antecedent can often be justifiably charged. 
 
Burke might reply that this charge would be uncharitable. But 
certainly he would not be able to deny that he argues in his pa-
per for the conclusion in (3), and that he does rely on something 
like premise (2) to support it. Burke is also clearly committed to 
(1), even though he never states it in this manner. (What he says 
is that an argument instantiating a B-pattern “almost surely is” 
an example of denying the antecedent: p. 26, emphasis in origi-
nal.) And it does not seem plausible to attribute to him the con-
verse of the conditional in (1), which would make the argument 
valid. (Recall that “B patterns” cover any patterns that include a 
“feature indicating . . . that the conditional contained by the pas-
sage is a premise”: p. 26.) So Burke’s reply would have to be 
that this particular reconstruction fails to capture his argument 
for that conclusion. Note, however, that there is no single, dis-
crete passage in his paper—no neatly patterned sequence of sen-
tences—in which that argument is expressed. The charity, or 
lack thereof, of the reconstruction does not turn on the existence 
of any such passage. The reconstruction above can be offered as 
a reconstruction of an argument made by Burke in his paper, 
even if the material for the reconstruction is culled from differ-
ent paragraphs or even different sections. Perhaps this recon-
struction is uncharitable (we are not fully sure); but that has 
nothing to do with the grammatical patterns of any fragment of 
Burke’s text. 
There is another, related consideration. Burke has limited 
his search for examples of denying the antecedent to precisely 
those instances in which we would least expect to find them: 
passages whose grammatical form already closely resembles the 
form of the reconstructed (fallacious) argument, and in which 
any formal fallacy would therefore be at its very clearest. Text-
books may prefer such examples for exactly this reason—which 
makes textbooks a singularly poor source for the broader claims 
about argumentation in general that Burke is seeking to defend. 
Burke’s (already small) sample of arguments is rendered unusa-
ble by a fatal dose of selection bias. 
If our argument so far is correct, Burke has given us no rea-
son to accept his conclusion that published arguments can rarely 
if ever be justifiably charged with the fallacy of denying the an-
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tecedent. Indeed, if there is no necessary correspondence be-
tween the grammatical form of an argument as actually ex-
pressed by an arguer, and the form in which we reconstruct and 
represent that argument, it is difficult to see what—other than a 
painstaking and comprehensive analysis of a huge number of 
different texts—could provide a reason in support of a strong, 
general claim like Burke’s. While we can certainly accept 
Burke’s insight that many of what may seem, superficially, to be 
examples of the fallacy of denying the antecedent will turn out, 
when properly interpreted, to be valid arguments, his interpreta-
tive method fails to generate reasons in support of his broader 
claim. 
If, moreover, we could readily find examples of arguments 
that can be justifiably charged with committing the fallacy—
even by Burke’s own “fairness” standard—then we would have 
positive reason to think that Burke is wrong. And given what we 
just said about selection bias, that reason would be strengthened 
if we could find such examples in published passages whose 
grammatical form does track relatively closely one of the formal 
patterns of denying the antecedent. If this fallacy can be justifi-
ably charged even when at its clearest, then we have, ceteris pa-
ribus, reason to think that it may be more prevalent when the 
grammatical structure of the passage does not resemble the for-
mal pattern of reconstruction. 
We have already given one such example: the second argu-
ment from the passage by Russell that we used as our epigraph. 
Here is how it can be reconstructed: 
 
(1)  For every x: if x does not believe in God, then x            
  does not behave well. 
(2)  Henry VIII believed in God. 
 Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3)  Henry VIII behaved well. 
 
Does Burke’s principle of fairness require that we interpret Rus-
sell’s passage as expressing a valid argument at this point?  
Let us assume there are two constraints here: we must have 
good reason to suppose that the stated conditional is part of the 
argument, and not performing some other (e.g. rhetorical) role; 
and we must have good reason to think that the arguer was not 
also committed to or relying on the converse of that conditional 
(or, indeed, on any other conditional that could rescue the argu-
ment’s validity). Note that these constraints are in fact signifi-
cantly stronger than those proposed by Burke, whose explicit 
view is that the fact that the stated conditional is part of the ar-
gument is itself sufficient grounds to conclude that the argument 
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“almost surely” is an instance of denying the antecedent, and 
can be justifiably charged as such (p. 26).  
But even this strengthened version of Burke’s principle of 
fairness cannot, in our view, rescue Russell’s argument. First, 
we have very good reason to suppose that here Russell must in-
deed intend the explicitly stated conditional to be part of the ar-
gument: that conditional is the “moralistic” proposition that 
Russell means to refute (but could only do so with this argument 
if denying the antecedent were a valid form: Russell’s point is 
that since the conclusion is false, and premise (2) true, premise 
(1) cannot but be false). Secondly, we have equally good rea-
sons—reasons of charity—to reject the idea that Russell is in 
fact relying on the converse of the explicit conditional or on the 
corresponding biconditional (either of which would render the 
argument valid). It is, in the first instance, highly implausible 
that anyone ever held mere belief in God as a sufficient condi-
tion of good behaviour, and it would thus have been wholly un-
charitable for Russell to have attributed that view to his inter-
locutors. Perhaps more importantly, Russell is clear that he is 
here offering a criticism of William James’s moralistic argu-
ment, which had been set forth in the 1891 essay “The Moral 
Philosopher and the Moral Life”.3 In that essay, James makes 
the claim that religious belief brings with it certain psychologi-
cal benefits that are necessary for what he calls “strenuous” 
moral living. He never claims that religious belief is sufficient to 
ensure that all believers will live strenuously in this manner, and 
he is explicit that even those who do live strenuously might not 
do so in accordance with the correct moral principles (“[E]xactly 
what the thought of the infinite thinker may be is hidden from us 
even were we sure of his existence; so that our postulation of 
him after all serves only to let loose in us the strenuous mood”: 
see James 1891, p. 162). Russell’s own stated target, then, can-
not be charitably taken to have asserted that belief in God is suf-
ficient for good behaviour. Indeed, on no plausible reading of 
James’s essay is he committed to any general proposition to 
which the behaviour of Henry VIII would be an apt counterex-
ample. Rather than assume that Russell was attacking a straw 
man, or had made a basic error in his understanding of James’s 
text, it is more charitable—or at least no less charitable—to take 
him to have denied the antecedent. 
But if Russell’s passage does not strike you as fully clear, 
here is a more recent example susceptible to a similar analysis—
an argument by Nick Cohen writing in The Guardian. It shares 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Slater’s annotation in Russell (1997/1952, p. 768). 
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with Russell’s the characteristic of being an attempted refutation 
by counterexample (Cohen 2014): 
 
I’m losing count of and patience with the apologists who 
tell me there would be no morality without religion. The 
failure of the serious press and BBC to question this is as 
shocking as it is depressing. We are almost 150 years on 
from the moment in 1867 when Matthew Arnold heard 
the sea of faith’s “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” 
on Dover Beach. Are religious writers suggesting mid-
Victorian Britain was a more moral country in its treat-
ment of women, homosexuals and the poor?  
 
Here, we do not have an explicit, grammatical conditional, and a 
little more rewriting of the premises is necessary to bring out the 
form of the argument. But the claim that Cohen is seeking to 
refute is clearly (as was Russell’s) the assertion that religion is a 
necessary condition of morality. Cohen tries to refute this by 
discussing countries, rather than individuals, but that does not 
significantly alter the analysis: 
 
(1)  For every x: if x is not a religious country, then 
  x is not a moral country. 
(2) Mid-Victorian Britain was a religious country. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Mid-Victorian Britain was a moral country. 
 
Again, the claim that religion is a necessary condition of morali-
ty is clearly part of the argument: there is no other way to under-
stand it. Likewise, it would be uncharitable to suggest that Co-
hen was in fact relying—in order to attack it—on the extremely 
implausible conditional premise that asserted that religion was 
sufficient for morality. As with Russell’s passage, the most char-
itable interpretation here is that Cohen has committed the fallacy 
of denying the antecedent. 
(Cohen’s last sentence might suggest a different interpreta-
tion: he could be taken to be attributing to his opponents not 
merely the view that  
 
(1*)  Religion is a necessary condition of morality,  
 
but also something like the view that  
 
(2*)  If religion is a necessary condition of morality, then 
  (if a country x is more religious than another country 
  y, then country x is more moral than country y).  
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Cohen could then be taken to be denying the consequent of this 
conditional—the conditional in (2*)—by pointing out, by way 
of counter-example, that mid-Victorian Britain, though more 
religious than contemporary Britain, was nonetheless less moral 
than contemporary Britain; and that would enable him, by mo-
dus tollens, to reject (1*). Under this interpretation, Cohen’s ar-
gument would not be formally fallacious; but it would rely on 
the implausible and highly uncharitable supposition that anyone 
who believes (1*) is thereby committed to (2*). Defenders of 
(1*) could simply reply that contemporary Britain, though less 
religious than mid-Victorian Britain, is nonetheless still a suffi-
ciently religious country—that it meets whatever threshold of 
religiosity a country must meet in order to be moral—and that 
(1*) is of course consistent with even the most religious of 
countries being utterly immoral. This alternative interpretation, 
then, seems to us not to be differentially justified: our ascription 
to Cohen of a formally fallacious argument is no less charitable 
towards him—to say the least—than a reading that acquits him 
from the fallacy only at the cost of finding him guilty of being 
extremely uncharitable towards his opponents.) 
We thus have no reason to think, and some reason to deny, 
that published arguments seldom commit the fallacy of denying 
the antecedent. 
 
 
2.  The fallacy that sometimes isn’t? 
 
In this section, we consider certain arguments advanced in three 
recent articles. Prominent in each of these articles is the claim 
that there are, in certain contexts, “legitimate” instances of the 
argumentative form of denying the antecedent, and that attend-
ing to these instances requires a revision of traditional approach-
es to the fallacy. It is this claim that is of interest to us in what 
follows.4 And we propose the following test for the success of 
any version of such a claim: an instance of the argumentative 
form of denying the antecedent is legitimate if and only if (a) the 
argument is cogent, and (b) the cogency of the argument does 
not depend on the addition of other premises or assumptions, or 
on the alteration of the conclusion to something other than the 
negation of the consequent of the conditional. We will take the 
first constraint to be met if the argument provides some reason 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Each of the articles also makes a range of interesting points in relation to 
other matters—offering, in particular, analyses of what is actually going on in 
arguments that might at first be thought to resemble denials of the anteced-
ent—but these are not our concern here. 
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for its conclusion—even a (weak) defeasible reason for a (weak) 
probabilistic conclusion. Put otherwise, the argument need not 
be deductively valid, or even inductively strong; but it must 
have provided some reason for us to believe in the truth of its 
conclusion. 
 It seems plausible to us to view these as minimal constraints 
on the argumentative legitimacy of any use of denying the ante-
cedent. An argument that fails to provide a reason in the sense 
outlined above is not a legitimate instance of denying the ante-
cedent; and an argument whose cogency depends on the addition 
of further premises or the alteration of the conclusion is not an 
instance of denying the antecedent at all. It is worth noting also 
that one well-noted legitimate use of the form of denying the 
antecedent—arguments in which the inference from premises to 
conclusion is semantically, rather than formally, valid—passes 
this test without difficulty; but that, of course, requires no revi-
sion of the traditional approach to the fallacy. 
 
2.1  A legitimate argumentative strategy? 
 
Just over a decade ago, David Godden and Douglas Walton 
made what sounds like a bold claim: that even “in cases where 
the conditional employed in [an] argument is properly interpret-
ed as a Philonian (or material) conditional, there are non-
fallacious uses of the strategy of denying the antecedent” (God-
den and Walton 2004, p. 219). They explicitly state that they are 
advancing this claim against those who maintain that “it [is] al-
ways fallacious to argue in the form of denying the antecedent” 
given a material interpretation of the conditional (p. 225). 
If successful, this would indeed be a significant result—one 
compelling a rethink, or at least a nuancing, of the orthodox po-
sition on denying the antecedent as a formal fallacy. But they 
are not successful. To see why, we can begin by noting what 
Godden and Walton are not denying (p. 230): 
 
[T]here is a use of DA [denying the antecedent] which is 
properly interpreted as a deductively fallacious form of 
argument. Should the move of denying the antecedent 
occur as a move made by the proponent in an attempt to 
establish [the negation of]5 the consequent, then the 
standard account of DA, on which it is a fallacious move 
in the argument, applies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This is our insertion; we assume that it was omitted from the original in 
error. 
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So far, so orthodox. Godden and Walton suggest, however (p. 
230), that if the relevant claims occur within an argumentative 
dialogue, then 
 
should the move of denying the antecedent occur as a 
move made by the respondent to an argument, a second 
usage of denying the antecedent might apply on which 
the move is not fallacious.  
 
Specifically, if a proponent (“Pro”) of a particular conclusion 
puts forward an argument in the modus ponens form—coupling 
a conditional premise with the assertion of its antecedent—the 
respondent (“Resp”) in the dialogue can respond with a “denial 
of the antecedent” (p. 230): 
 
This is the move which concerns us here. In a counter-
argument of this sort, the conditional premise of Pro’s in-
itial argument is accepted by Resp. But Resp rejects the 
move, made by Pro, of affirming the antecedent. Instead, 
Resp denies the antecedent. 
 
Again, Godden and Walton are careful not to claim that the re-
spondent proceeds on this basis to affirm the negation of the 
consequent. Rather, “the antecedent is denied in an attempt to 
establish that the consequent [which is the proponent’s argu-
ment’s conclusion] is not acceptable on the grounds expressed 
by the conditional premise” (pp. 231, 234-5): 
 
Pro’s conclusion . . . is rebutted by Resp’s counter-
conclusion that [Pro’s conclusion] has not been shown to 
be justified, and that if it is to be accepted as justified it 
must be done for reasons other than those so far provided 
by Pro. This counter-conclusion is supported by Resp 
with an argument which has the form of denying the an-
tecedent. 
 
There is, we think, a significant problem with this account. 
When Godden and Walton refer to “an argument which has the 
form of denying the antecedent,” they oscillate between using 
this phrase to refer to an argument with that form, and to refer to 
a simple statement that denies a sufficient condition. That is, 
their use of the phrase “argument with the form of denying the 
antecedent” equivocates between an argument with the follow-
ing form: 
(1) If p, then q. 
(2) It is not the case that p. 
Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) It is not the case that q. 
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and a statement like (2) made in a dialogical argumentative con-
text in which someone else has put forth a statement like (1) as 
part of a modus ponens argument for q. Again, on this the au-
thors are clear: in the context of such a dialogue, “denying the 
antecedent”—in the sense of asserting a claim like (2) in re-
sponse to the other party’s modus ponens—cannot legitimately 
be used to warrant a claim like (3); it can only warrant the claim 
that the other party has “failed to . . . establish the conclusion of 
her conditional [modus ponens] argument”, which will “shift the 
burden of proof” back to the proponent (p. 231). But then God-
den and Walton present no challenge whatsoever—differently 
from what they claim—to what they call the “standard account” 
(p. 219) of arguments that have the form of denying the ante-
cedent. Their account simply does not address arguments of this 
form at all. In other words, they fail to meet the second of our 
two minimal constraints.6 
If this is correct, then what Godden and Walton have shown 
is that where, in an argumentative dialogue, one party relies on a 
premise p in support of her conclusion, then taking issue with p 
is a “legitimate argumentative move” for the respondent party 
who wishes to take issue with the conclusion. But could anyone 
ever have thought otherwise? This seems to amount to nothing 
more than the claim that we can legitimately seek to undermine 
other people’s arguments by questioning their premises. 
The authors themselves seem at points to acknowledge this 
result, noting the affinities between their proposed approach and 
some “widely received” views in the “theory of rebuttal, or 
counter-argument” (p. 237-8): 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 An anonymous reviewer has suggested to us that Godden and Walton might 
be interpreted as making the point that instances of the following pattern will 
always be cogent arguments: 
 
 (1') It has been established that if p, then q. 
 (2') It has not been established that p. 
 (3') It has not been established that q. 
 
But this is not obviously the pattern of denying the antecedent; and as this 
pattern stands, at any rate, the conjunction of (1') and (2') would by itself give 
us no reason to think that q has not been established (in the relevant context 
of argumentation)—which is of course also the reason why instances of 
denying the antecedent are not formally valid arguments. And if, on the other 
hand, it is only the relevant argumentative context that entitles us to say that a 
party’s failure to establish p makes it more likely than not (or even certain) 
that q has not been established, then it is this further premise that will be do-
ing the argumentative work, and the argument would again no longer count 
as an instance of denying the antecedent. 
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In this general framework [of a theory of rebuttal], the 
legitimate use of denying the antecedent is just a special 
case of showing that an argument is a bad one by show-
ing that it has a bad premise. Specifically, in a target ar-
gument of a modus ponens form, while the conditional 
premise may be acceptable, the premise which asserts the 
antecedent of the conditional may not be. Denying the 
antecedent rebuts the initial argument by denying this 
premise . . . As such, denying the antecedent works as a 
form of rebuttal by undercutting the initial argument by 
showing that it has an unacceptable premise . . . Denying 
the antecedent and showing an argument to be flawed 
due to an unacceptable premise are analogous in regard 
to both their argumentative effects and the type of con-
clusion they licence. 
 
As should be clear, however, “denying the antecedent” in the 
sense that Godden and Walton intend it here is in no helpful 
sense “analogous” to showing an argument to be flawed due to 
an unacceptable premise: the former is simply one instance of 
the latter. Nor is it a “special case”; it is simply a case, which 
might appear special only as a result of an equivocation be-
tween the formally fallacious pattern of argument called “deny-
ing the antecedent” and a statement denying an antecedent upon 
whose affirmation one’s interlocutor is relying.7 The authors, 
aware of this issue, seek to address it in a final footnote; but 
their remarks do nothing but restate the equivocation in starker 
terms still (p. 242, n. 24): 
 
[W]e claim that the project of this paper is . . . worth-
while. While it should be conceded that “whenever a re-
spondent denies any of [the] proponent’s premises, he 
shifts the burden of proof back to [the] proponent” it does 
not follow that “there is nothing special about the case 
here singled out”. There is something very special about 
the case we have singled out: namely, it is typically clas-
sified as a formal fallacy of argument! 
 
For the reasons given above, we think this last claim false. There 
is no challenge to the standard account of denying the anteced-
ent to be found along these lines. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Note, also, that the strategy of rejecting the antecedent of the proponent’s 
conditional premise is in no way weakened by the fact that the respondent 
chooses to deny the proponent’s conditional premise as well; nor is it 
strengthened if the respondent accepts (or simply chooses not to take issue 
with) the conditional premise. The acceptability of each of the proponent’s 
premises is a separate question, and there is nothing particularly noteworthy 
about the case in which the respondent does reject one, but not the other. 
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2.2  An informational shortcut? 
 
A different attempt to rehabilitate the formal fallacy of denying 
the antecedent (as well as the formal fallacy of affirming the 
consequent) is made by Floridi (2009). Floridi too opens with 
strong claims. He indicts logic for its “ungreen policy” regard-
ing the formal fallacies. Instead of discarding them “as absolute-
ly worthless rubbish”, we should be “recycling” the fallacies so 
as not to “waste their potential contribution to our information 
processes”. For the formal fallacies can be “rather useful . . . 
ways to gain and manage one’s information”: they are “not mere 
mistakes of no value, but informational shortcuts that can be ep-
istemically fruitful if carefully managed” (p. 318). That is what 
Floridi promises to show; our view is that he too is unsuccessful. 
Floridi’s proposed “greener” (p. 318) interpretation of the 
formal fallacies relies on Bayes’s theorem. He works with the 
following example (p. 320): 
 
Suppose Jill receives many emails, but only a few of 
them (say 2%) are infected by some software virus. She 
uses a rather reliable antivirus software, which is success-
ful 95% of the time. The latter does not erase her poten-
tially infected emails, but moves them to a special quar-
antine folder in the e-mail client software, which Jill can 
check. Jill wonders how often she should check it for 
good emails. 
 
The example is clear. Then Floridi writes (p. 320):  
 
The question [Jill] is implicitly asking is: “what is the 
probability that A (=the email was infected), given the 
fact that B (=the email was blocked by the antivirus and 
placed in the quarantine folder) when, on average, 2% of 
all the emails I receive are actually infected and my anti-
virus is successful 95% of the time, that is, it provides 
only 5% false positives?” 
 
This is a slightly awkward formulation of Jill’s question. What 
she wants to know is what is the probability that an email—not 
“the” email (what email?)—that has been blocked is actually 
infected. Bayes’s theorem enables Jill to calculate the answer: 
the chance that a blocked email is infected is 28%. “Clearly,” as 
Floridi says (p. 320), “Jill should check her folder regularly.” 
But what does this have to do with the formal fallacies? Flo-
ridi brings Maggie into the picture. He says that Maggie, differ-
ently from Jill, is not “a smart girl”. She “uses the same antivi-
rus as Jill, and receives roughly the same number of emails”, but 
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she is “astonished” when Jill tells her that “she should check her 
quarantine folder regularly” (p. 321).  
Why is Maggie astonished? Here Floridi’s story becomes 
less clear. He says (p. 321) that Maggie 
 
thought that, if the email was infected, then the antivirus 
blocked it, and since the quarantine folder contains only 
emails blocked by the antivirus, then all the emails in it 
must be infected. 
  
Why would Maggie think that “if the email was infected, then 
the antivirus blocked it”? Floridi does not say, but there seems 
to be only one plausible answer. Maggie must have been una-
ware that the antivirus was only 95% reliable. She must have 
believed, falsely, that it was 100% reliable.  
Floridi continues:  
 
More formally, [Maggie] reasoned that A → B, B ⊢ A. 
Jill explains to Maggie that the previous inference is a 
typical fallacy (AC) [the fallacy of affirming the conse-
quent], but that she should not feel silly at all. 
 
Maybe Jill is not as smart as all that. Maggie’s reasoning, at 
least as Floridi describes it, does not look like the fallacy of af-
firming the consequent at all. Rather, it looks like this: 
 
(1)  All infected emails are blocked. 
(2) All emails in the folder are blocked. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) All emails in the folder are infected. 
 
This argument is not valid; but it is not an instance of the fallacy 
of affirming the consequent. The problem is that Floridi’s de-
scription of Maggie’s reasoning is equivocal: is Maggie reason-
ing about “all the emails” in the folder, as Floridi writes at one 
point, or about a particular email (“the email”), as he writes at 
another point in the same passage? But we can fill in the exam-
ple to make it fit Floridi’s own claims about it. Assume that 
Maggie was reasoning about some particular email: for example, 
an email that Jill told her she had sent her the night before, and 
which (since it was not in Maggie’s regular inbox folder) Mag-
gie knew had been blocked. So Maggie—according to Floridi—
would be reasoning like this: 
 
(1)  All infected emails are blocked. 
(2)  The email that Jill sent me yesterday is blocked. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)),  
(3)  The email that Jill sent me yesterday is infected. 
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This is an instance of the universal form of the fallacy of affirm-
ing the consequent:  
 
(1) For every x: if x is S, then x is P. 
(2)  a is P. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) a is S. 
 
This seems to be what Floridi has in mind. Yet if indeed this is 
how Maggie reasoned, then why should she “not feel silly”? 
Here is Floridi’s explanation. He asks us first to “suppose” 
(counterfactually) that we actually have “perfect, infallible anti-
virus software” that generates “no false positives” (and no false 
negatives) (p. 321). To be clear, this means that it would then be 
true both that (for the domain of emails received by Maggie) 
 
For every x: if x is blocked, then x is infected, 
 
and that 
 
For every x: if x is infected, then x is blocked. 
 
That means that the probability that a blocked email is not in-
fected would be 0; and the probability that an infected email is 
blocked would be 1. The double implication would therefore be 
true: 
 
For every x: x is infected if and only if x is blocked. 
 
Floridi says that “perhaps” Maggie “had in mind” the “double 
implication” (p. 321). Perhaps she did: but then she must have 
falsely believed that the antivirus was 100% reliable; for other-
wise the double implication would not hold. And if she did have 
the double implication in mind, then her argument, though un-
sound (since the double implication was actually false), would 
be deductively valid. The other possibility, Floridi says, is that 
she did have in mind the formally invalid argument—the uni-
versal form of affirming of the consequent—sketched above. 
But “either way”, he claims, 
 
Maggie was taking a shortcut (she disregarded the proba-
bilities) to focus on the sort of information that she could 
extract from the fact that those emails were in the quaran-
tine folder. And on the wise advice of being safe rather 
than sorry, she treated all its content as dangerous. The 
result is that Maggie is ontologically thrifty (she trusts 
many less items than Jill) but logically greener (she relies 
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on a reasoning that, although formally fallacious, can still 
be recycled to provide a quick and dirty way of extracting 
useful information from her environment). 
 
We find this puzzling; we cannot see how this description 
squares with Floridi’s own example. What does it mean to say 
that Maggie “disregarded” the probabilities? One thing it might 
mean, as we suggested, is that she was actually unaware of the 
possibility that a blocked email would not be infected. But Flo-
ridi’s description suggests that this is not the actual issue: it sug-
gests that Maggie somehow chose to “focus” on the “sort of in-
formation that she could extract from the fact that those emails 
were in the quarantine folder”—that is, that she was aware of 
the possibility that not all blocked emails would be infected. But 
then why should she “treat all its content as dangerous”? That is 
certainly not a “wise” decision, since she will risk missing quite 
a few important emails if she does not check the quarantine 
folder regularly. 
One way to make sense of Floridi’s example would be to 
say that Maggie is aware that the antivirus is only 95% relia-
ble—and thus aware that possibly, some blocked emails are ac-
tually not infected—but that she is also under the erroneous im-
pression that the probability that a blocked email is infected is 
very high. Perhaps that is why Maggie is “astonished” (p. 321) 
when Jill informs her that the actual probability is around 28%. 
So maybe this is what Floridi means: Maggie got her probabili-
ties wrong. She falsely supposed that there is a very low proba-
bility that she would find any non-infected emails in the quaran-
tine folder; and for that reason she had decided—until Jill came 
along and set her straight—not to check the folder all that often. 
So the probabilities she “disregarded” were not the actual prob-
abilities, but what she took to be the very low probability that 
she (falsely) assigned to an email in the folder not being infect-
ed. 
Still, if this is what Floridi means, what then does it mean to 
say that Maggie is “taking a shortcut . . . to focus on the sort of 
information she could extract from the fact that those emails 
were in the folder” (p. 321)? Or that Maggie was being “logical-
ly greener” than Jill, because she “relies on a reasoning that, alt-
hough fallacious, can still be recycled to provide a quick and 
dirty way of extracting useful information from her environ-
ment” (p. 322)? 
If Maggie decides not to check the folder very often be-
cause she thinks the probability that it contains non-infected 
emails is very low, then one thing we can say is that she is tak-
ing a risk (which she believes is very low) that she might miss 
some important email. Floridi does at one point say something 
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like that: he speaks of reasoners like Maggie as making “bets” 
which may be “risky” (p. 322). But in “betting” that Jill’s email, 
which was blocked, is actually infected, Maggie is not “relying” 
on any fallacious reasoning whatsoever. She could of course jus-
tify her decision in conversation by saying simply that in her 
view, “if an email is in the folder, it is infected”; but what she 
would thereby mean, and conversationally implicate, would be 
that if an email is in the folder then it is almost certainly infect-
ed (or something along these lines). So her view that one should 
not be checking the quarantine folder all that often would be 
grounded on the claim that 
 
For every x: if x is blocked, then x is almost certainly in-
fected. 
 
Her argument would therefore really be: 
 
(1)  For every x: if x is blocked, then x is almost certainly 
  infected. 
(2) The email that Jill sent me yesterday is blocked. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) The email that Jill sent me yesterday is almost certain
  ly infected. 
 
There is nothing fallacious about this; the argument is deduc-
tively valid. If Floridi’s point is that Maggie’s decision not to 
check the quarantine folder very often is perfectly rational given 
her belief that it is very unlikely that the folder contains emails 
that are not infected, then he is of course right (though the point 
is not controversial). But there is nothing here that can plausibly 
be described as “relying” on “fallacious reasoning” as a way of 
“extracting useful information from her environment” (p. 322). 
The rationality of Maggie’s decision is not a matter of what she 
has “a decent right to conclude” (p. 318); it is a matter of wheth-
er she has a decent chance of not missing important emails. 
Sensing that his claims may be perceived as “unclear”, Flo-
ridi goes on to offer another illustration (p. 322): 
 
Maggie’s teacher tells her that, if she doesn’t study 
enough, then she will fail her exam. Unfortunately, Mag-
gie does fail her exam and the teacher reproaches her for 
not having studied enough. Maggie has learnt her Bayes-
ian lesson, so she knows the teacher’s reasoning is falla-
cious. But she also knows that it is fairly accurate, as a 
shortcut that gets things right most of the time: on aver-
age, students who fail their exams have not studied 
enough. The teacher should have simply sprinkled her in-
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ference and then judgment with some “probably” and 
“most likely” clauses. 
 
Yet this example, too, is equivocal; and again no plausible read-
ing of a situation like this would support Floridi’s claims about 
the formal fallacies. Once more we are not told whether Mag-
gie’s teacher actually realises that it is perfectly possible for a 
student to have studied enough and still fail the exam; but we 
may assume that, being a teacher, she does realise that. Let us 
also assume that the teacher knows that the probability that a 
student who fails did not study enough is relatively high, and in 
any case higher than 0.5. Now Floridi tells us that the teacher—
presumably without first inquiring whether some other factor 
might explain Maggie’s failure—“reproaches” Maggie “for not 
having studied enough”. How then did the teacher reason? 
Given the relatively high probability (of which the teacher 
was aware) that, having failed the exam, Maggie did not study 
enough, the teacher may have decided to go with that hypothesis 
for practical purposes, and thus to berate Maggie for not having 
studied enough. This seems to be what Floridi has in mind. But 
this does not establish that the teacher jumped to—took a 
“shortcut” to—the conclusion that Maggie did not study enough. 
The teacher jumped, if anything, to action, to an action—
berating Maggie—that might turn out not to be justified after all 
(if it turns out that Maggie did study enough). But this does not 
mean, and there is no reason to suppose, that the teacher mistook 
necessity for probability—Floridi says at one point (p. 320) that 
one possible “explanation” of the formal fallacies is that people 
“mistake necessity for probability”—and formed the view that 
necessarily, if Maggie failed the exam, then she did not study 
enough. 
Floridi’s claim that the teacher is “using” the formal fallacy 
of affirming the consequent as a “quick and dirty informational 
shortcut” is therefore unfounded, as is his more general claim (p. 
322) that “[w]hen we use [the formal fallacies of affirming the 
consequent and denying the antecedent]”, we 
 
bet that A→B, B, ⊢ A or that A→B, ¬A, ⊢ ¬B. The bet 
might be risky (we might be wrong), but it often pays 
back handsomely in terms of lower amount of infor-
mation resources needed to reach a conclusion (see the 
case of the teacher assessing whether Maggie studied 
enough). 
 
This again is a distorted description of what is going on. When 
berating Maggie, the teacher is indeed—as was Maggie in the 
email example—taking the risk that her action is not justified. 
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But this is a risk of which she is perfectly aware. If she is aware 
of the risk, she is aware of the possibility that Maggie did study 
enough. And if she is aware of this possibility, then she cannot 
be reasoning that 
 
(1)  If Maggie does not study enough, she will fail the ex
  am. 
(2) Maggie failed the exam. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Maggie did not study enough. 
 
Rather, she reasons that 
 
 (1)  If Maggie failed the exam, then it is more likely than 
  not that she did not study enough. 
(2) Maggie failed the exam. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) It is more likely than not that she did not study  
  enough. 
 
The teacher then decides, on the basis of this likelihood, to be-
rate Maggie, thereby running the risk that she is being unfair. 
Differently from what Floridi says, then, her reasoning is not 
fallacious: the only plausible reading of the example is that 
teacher did “sprinkle” her inference with some “probably” and 
“most likely” clauses. And though it is again true that the teach-
er is in a sense “disregarding” the possibility that Maggie did 
study enough, this has nothing to do with her (theoretical) rea-
soning. Instead, it is in deciding to act as she did that she choos-
es to “disregard” that possibility, “betting”, as Floridi says, on 
the scenario that she thinks more likely to be true. There is no 
connection between the teacher’s “disregarding” that possibility 
and the formal fallacies. 
So nothing supports Floridi’s claim that the formal fallacies 
of affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent are 
“quick and dirty” informational shortcuts (p. 322); or that they 
can be “interpreted in terms of information-gathering and gain” 
(p. 324); or that the formal fallacies can “contribut[e] to our in-
formation processes” and can be “serviceable” when it comes to 
“extracting information from whatever is at hand and without 
much fuss.” (p. 318). His examples, properly understood, turn 
out to be cases in which (a) a person P believes that the proba-
bility of a given fact or outcome F is relatively low; (b) F is 
such that, if F is true, then P has reason not to perform a given 
action φ; and (c) P decides nonetheless to “bet” that F is actually 
not the case, and to perform action φ, taking the risk that φ is 
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unjustified. And there is no sense in which such a person can be 
said to be taking a “shortcut” to the conclusion that the negation 
of F is true. 
Despite his opening promise, then, Floridi’s approach too 
fails to satisfy the second of our minimal constraints. If we are 
right, he has failed to give us anything that can be called an “in-
terpretation” of the formal fallacies at all, let alone one that is 
“much more reasonable” (p. 318) than the one that logic tradi-
tionally affords.  
	  
2.3  An inductively strong argument? 
 
A third author to propose a “significant revision of the view that 
denying the antecedent is simply a formal fallacy that should be 
discarded” is Mark Stone (2012, p. 329). He seeks to combine 
the insights of Godden and Walton on the one hand, and Floridi 
on the other, and use them to make an even stronger claim. 
Stone says that he agrees with Godden and Walton that “an ar-
gument in which the arguer denies the antecedent can be legiti-
mate as a strategy for responding to a previous argument” (p. 
342). But he thinks Godden and Walton “construe the legitima-
cy of this argument strategy too narrowly” (p. 341). He wants to 
“go further” (pp. 329, 343): 
 
Whereas [Godden and Walton] maintain that the force of 
this type of argument is only that we should not accept 
the [proponent’s] conclusion C for the reasons given in 
the [proponent’s] initial conditional argument, I think its 
force is that we should probably accept not C, that is, we 
should probably reject C. In other words, I think denying 
the antecedent has inductive strength. This is the point at 
which I believe one can make a stronger case for the ef-
fectiveness of denying the antecedent in argumentation. 
 
What are his reasons? One of his working examples is Burke’s 
capital punishment case. Stone puts it in the context of an argu-
mentative dialogue, and imagines that someone makes “the fol-
lowing argument in favour of capital punishment” (pp. 343-4), 
which we will refer to as “Argument 1”: 
 
Argument 1 (a proponent’s argument in favour of capital 
punishment) 
(1)  If capital punishment deters murder, then it is justi
  fied. 
(2) Capital punishment deters murder. 
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  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Capital punishment is justified.8 
 
This is a valid argument; it is an instance of modus ponens. The 
“corresponding argument that denies the antecedent of this con-
ditional”, and which can be “a legitimate argumentative strate-
gy” (p. 343) with which a respondent might seek to undermine 
Argument 1, would be: 
 
Argument 2 (a respondent’s challenge to Argument 1) 
(1)  If capital punishment deterred murder, then it would 
  be justified. 
(2) Capital punishment does not deter murder. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Capital punishment is not justified. 
 
Oddly, Stone appears to take this—a respondent’s adoption of 
Argument 2—as the kind of “legitimate use” of “denying the 
antecedent” that Godden and Walton have in mind (cf. Stone 
2012, p. 344). Stone misses Godden and Walton’s equivocation, 
which we discussed in Section 2.1; and more importantly, he 
also seems at points to overlook Godden and Walton’s explicit 
claim that they do not think that a respondent who challenges 
something like Argument 1 by denying the antecedent of its 
conditional premise, is giving an argument for the claim that 
capital punishment is not justified. (In other words, Argument 
2—which actually is an instance of the formal fallacy of deny-
ing the antecedent, and whose conclusion is the actual claim that 
capital punishment is not justified—is not exactly the kind of 
challenge that Godden and Walton are concerned with.9) 
In any event, Stone begins to motivate his own views by 
taking issue with those authors who—like Burke, he says—
might want to reinterpret arguments like Argument 2 “in a way 
that eliminates the apparent fallacy” (p. 328), for example by 
replacing premise (1) with its inverse. Burke, says Stone, would 
suggest that we amend Argument 2 as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The way in which we graphically display these arguments differs slightly 
from Stone’s (for example, we number the arguments, and the premises and 
conclusion of each, for ease of reference); but the content of the arguments 
remains the same. 
9 “Legitimate employments of denying the antecedent”, Godden and Walton 
say, “cannot be modelled as arguments of the form ‘A ⊃ C, ~A ⊨ ~C’”; the 
respondent “does not seek to establish any claim . . . whatsoever”: rather, 
“the move is made in an attempt to demonstrate that [the proponent’s] 
C[onclusion] has not been established” (cf. Godden and Walton 2004, p. 
231). 
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Argument 3 (Burke’s revision of Argument 2) 
(1)  If capital punishment does not deter murder, then it is 
  not justified. 
(2) Capital punishment does not deter murder. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Capital punishment is not justified. 
 
Stone makes two claims in connection with this. One is that this 
revision does not make the argument better since “the same con-
siderations which may be raised to challenge denying the ante-
cedent [that is, to challenge Argument 2]” will hold equally 
against the revised, valid argument (p. 345). Suppose, for exam-
ple, that someone wants to argue “that capital punishment is jus-
tified for retributive reasons” (p. 345): 
 
With the valid argument [Argument 3] this challenge, if 
good, means that the argument is weak because the as-
sumed premise [premise (1) in Argument 3] is false. With 
denying the antecedent [Argument 2], it means that the 
argument is weak because it has clearly been shown that 
the premises may be true but the conclusion false. 
 
Stone’s second claim is his main thesis that an argument like 
Argument 2 is “inductively strong”: it “establishes that capital 
punishment is probably not justified” (p. 345), thus providing us 
with reasons to reject (and not merely reasons not to accept) the 
conclusion of Argument 1. 
 How is this thesis related to Stone’s attempt to broaden 
Godden and Walton’s account of denying the antecedent as a 
legitimate argumentative strategy? The thought appears to be 
this. To say that an argument is “inductively strong” is to say 
that if its premises are true, then the conclusion is probably true. 
But if the conclusion of Argument 2 is probably true, then its 
negation—which is the conclusion of Argument 1—is probably 
false. So Argument 2 gives us reason, if its premises are true, to 
reject the conclusion of Argument 1 (p. 329): 
 
The premises of an argument that denies the antecedent 
in [the] context [of its use “to undermine an opponent’s 
position for which plausible reasons have been or may be 
offered”] can have the logical force of an inductive ar-
gument, meaning that if the premises are true the conclu-
sion probably follows. In undermining the opponent’s 
position this form of argument provides reasons for be-
lieving that the position is false. 
 
Neither of Stone’s claims succeeds, however, and his own ex-
ample of the retributivist argument for capital punishment will 
Denying the Antecedent 
 
 
© Duarte d’Almeida, MacDonald. Informal Logic, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2016), pp. 26-63. 
51 
help us to see why. He is never clear about what that argument 
would actually look like, but it seems safe to suppose that it 
would run along the following lines: 
 
Argument 4 (the retributivist argument in favour of capital 
punishment) 
(1) If capital punishment is an appropriate retributive re
  sponse to murder, then it is justified. 
(2) Capital punishment is an appropriate retributive re
  sponse to murder. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Capital punishment is justified. 
 
Stone says that this argument can either be “good” or “fail” (p. 
345); and that “if good”, the argument holds equally against Ar-
guments 2 and 3. Given that Argument 4 is valid, what does it 
mean to say that it can either “fail” (or be “unsuccessful”: pp. 
346, 348) or be “good”? One thing it can mean is that Argument 
4 can be either sound or unsound. So let us suppose that the pro-
ponent of Argument 4 succeeds in showing that the argument is 
sound—that its premises are both true. Stone says that this 
would weaken Argument 2 by showing that its “premises may 
be true but the conclusion false” (p. 345). But this is misleading. 
It is true that if Argument 4 is sound, then the conclusion of Ar-
gument 2 is false. It is also true that the soundness of Argument 
4 is consistent with the truth of both premises of Argument 2. 
But in order to successfully show that in Argument 2 the truth of 
the premises is consistent with the falsehood of its conclusion, 
one does not have to endorse an argument like Argument 4. One 
only has to point out that it is logically possible that there are 
other justifying factors. In other words, the challenge against 
denying the antecedent is that the arguer failed to rule out other 
possibilities, not that those possibilities are actually realised; and 
this challenge, which suffices to refute Argument 2, has no bite 
against Argument 3.  
So Stone is wrong that—this was his first claim—the two 
versions of the deterrence-based argument against capital pun-
ishment (that is, the fallacious version in Argument 2, and the 
formally valid version in Argument 3) can both be weakened by 
the “same considerations” (p. 345). It is not the case, differently 
from what he says, that “the reconstructed valid argument may 
be criticised for the same reasons as the argument denying the 
antecedent” (p. 337). He is right, of course, that Argument 4, if 
sound, is also effective against Argument 3, since the soundness 
of Argument 4 entails that the conditional premise of Argument 
3 is false. But what that shows is that there are considerations 
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that hold equally against both versions, not that all considera-
tions that hold against one will hold against the other. 
What of Stone’s second claim—his thesis that an argument 
like Argument 2 has “inductive strength” (p. 346), establishing 
that capital punishment is “probably not justified” (p. 344)? 
Again, his argument for this claim is never presented in a 
straightforward way; but he thinks the inductive strength of Ar-
gument 2 “becomes apparent” if we now suppose that the retrib-
utivist challenge—Argument 4—“fails” (p. 345): 
 
I would argue that if the challenge fails, the argumenta-
tive force of denying the antecedent becomes apparent: it 
is inductively strong. [Argument 2] . . . establishes that 
capital punishment is probably not justified. 
 
This thought is repeated at several other points; for example (p. 
346): 
 
[S]omeone who believes that deterring murder is a suffi-
cient condition for justifying capital punishment, and 
who has evidence that it does not deter murder, can make 
an inductive argument in the form of denying the ante-
cedent [that is, an argument like Argument 2] that capital 
punishment is probably not justified. This argument has 
inductive strength. How strong it is depends on how suc-
cessful other arguments to justify capital punishment are. 
If the retributive argument suggested earlier [that is, Ar-
gument 4] is unsuccessful, then the inductive argument 
denying the antecedent is accordingly stronger. 
 
Or more generally (p. 348): 
 
The conclusion of the argument [Argument 2] that capital 
punishment is not justified is strengthened by the likeli-
hood that other justifications for capital punishment are 
unsuccessful. 
 
Here is what we take Stone’s point to be. Suppose you do be-
lieve that deterring murder would suffice to justify capital pun-
ishment; but you also believe, on good evidential grounds, that 
capital punishment does not in fact deter murder. That this one 
sufficient condition is not met does not of course establish that 
capital punishment is not justified. There may be other sufficient 
grounds of justification. Indeed, being an adequate retributive 
response to murder might be one: that would be the point 
pressed by anyone who endorsed Argument 4. So suppose you 
also agree that capital punishment would be justified if it were 
an appropriate retributive response to murder—you agree with 
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the conditional premise in Argument 4—but again you have rea-
son to believe that capital punishment does not in fact constitute 
an appropriate retributive response to murder. All this establish-
es is that there is another sufficient condition for the justifica-
tion of capital punishment that is not satisfied; the possibility 
remains that there are other sufficient conditions, conditions you 
have not yet considered, that would justify capital punishment as 
well. Still, there are only so many considerations you would be 
willing to assert as sufficient conditions for the justification of 
capital punishment. Suppose, then, that for any sufficient condi-
tion you can think of—including every one that an opponent 
might have put to you in an attempt to establish that capital pun-
ishment is justified—you have reason to think that that condi-
tion is either not satisfied, or unlikely to be satisfied. In that 
case, since you believe (a) that deterrence is a sufficient condi-
tion for justifying capital punishment, (b) that capital punish-
ment does not deter murder—these are the two premises in Ar-
gument 2—and (c) that it is unlikely that capital punishment can 
be justified on other grounds, then of course you will be justified 
in believing (d) that the conclusion that capital punishment is 
not justified—which is the conclusion in Argument 2—is proba-
bly false. 
(What makes other possibilities unlikely is a matter of either 
(a) it being unlikely that there are other true conditionals setting 
out sufficient conditions for justifying capital punishment; or (b) 
if there are other such conditionals, it being unlikely that their 
antecedents are satisfied.) 
Note, however, that the unlikelihood that there are other 
sufficient conditions that happen to be satisfied has nothing to 
do with the “strength” of any denying-the-antecedent move; it 
has nothing to do with the fact that both premises in Argument 2 
may actually be true. Rather, the claim that no other sufficient 
condition is likely to be satisfied turns on considerations extra-
neous to that denying-the-antecedent move.10 So in order for 
someone’s reliance on premises (1) and (2) of Argument 2 to 
warrant—as Stone claims it would—the conclusion that capital 
punishment is probably not justified, the argument would have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In a recent paper, Godden and Zenker (2015), who also engage at length 
with Stone’s account, argue that “in whatever way indicative conditionals are 
interpreted, the [putative] cogency of DA [denying the antecedent] and AC 
[affirming the consequent] depends on contingent factors that are unasserted 
by, and remain independent of, the denial of antecedents or the affirmation of 
consequents” (p. 120); “DA and AC arguments as stated are not probative—
they fail to provide reasons for their conclusions—unless such assumptions 
are explicated and met” (p. 106). We agree, and have sought to offer a differ-
ent argument for this conclusion. 
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to include a further premise stating that capital punishment is 
probably not justified unless it deters murder; and the conclu-
sion of the argument would have to be rewritten to state that 
capital punishment is probably not justified (or something to 
that effect): 
 
Argument 5 
(1)  If capital punishment deterred murder, then it would 
  be justified. 
(2) Capital punishment does not deter murder. 
(3) If capital punishment does not deter murder, it is 
  probably not justified. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2) and (3)), 
(4) Capital punishment is probably not justified. 
 
Premise (3) is a further premise in the sense that its negation is 
consistent with the assertion of the two premises in the original 
version of the argument (the denial-of-the-antecedent version in 
Argument 2). 
Our point, then, is that unless premise (3) is included, the 
conclusion that capital punishment is probably not justified is 
not warranted. Whether the conclusion is warranted, therefore, is 
something that has nothing to do with any “legitimate role” 
played by denying the antecedent “in establishing that a position 
is improbable” (Stone 2012, p. 348). In fact, it seems unhelpful 
and even misleading to discuss this under the “denying the ante-
cedent” heading. After all, as soon as premise (3) is included, 
premise (1) becomes superfluous: the conclusion in Argument 5 
follows deductively from premises (2) and (3) alone. So what 
we are really left with is 
 
Argument 6 
(1) Capital punishment does not deter murder. 
(2) If capital punishment does not deter murder, it is 
  probably not justified. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)), 
(3) Capital punishment is probably not justified. 
 
This is a valid argument, and one in which premise (1) is no 
longer denying any “antecedent”. So Stone’s analysis gets 
things doubly wrong: it leaves the crucial premise out of the ar-
gument, and leaves in a needless one. If this is Stone’s point, he 
too fails to satisfy the second of our minimal constraints. 
Could Stone object that we are missing his main claim? Is 
his thesis not that an argument like Argument 2 has “inductive 
strength”—that it establishes that “capital punishment is proba-
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bly not justified”—regardless of how successful other argu-
ments for justifying capital punishment may be? He says that if 
these other arguments fail, Argument 2 becomes inductively 
stronger, but does he not think that Argument 2 has “inductive 
strength” even if such arguments succeed? Here is the relevant 
passage again (p. 348): 
 
[S]omeone who believes that deterring murder is a suffi-
cient condition for justifying capital punishment, and 
who has evidence that it does not deter murder, can make 
an inductive argument in the form of denying the ante-
cedent [like Argument 2] that capital punishment is prob-
ably not justified. This argument has inductive strength. 
How strong it is depends on how successful other argu-
ments to justify capital punishment are. If the retributive 
argument suggested earlier [that is, Argument 4] is un-
successful, then the inductive argument denying the ante-
cedent is accordingly stronger. 
 
If someone believes that deterring murder is a sufficient condi-
tion for justifying capital punishment, then if they have evidence 
that it does deter murder, then obviously they can claim that 
capital punishment is probably—indeed certainly, since the 
probability would be 100%—justified. But it does not follow, of 
course, that evidence that capital punishment does not deter 
murder would warrant the claim that capital punishment is prob-
ably not justified. We could grant that if the premises of Argu-
ment 2 are both true, then its conclusion—that capital punish-
ment is not justified—is thereby rendered more probable, more 
likely to be true. But that is not enough to support Stone’s claim 
that Argument 2—or denying the antecedent more generally—
establishes the opposite conclusion as “probably” false. What 
Stone’s claim requires is not merely that the premises of an ar-
gument like Argument 2 establish the conclusion as more likely 
to be true than if the premises were false. What Stone’s claim 
requires is that the premises of such an argument establish the 
conclusion as more likely to be true than false. 
In fact, Stone does not carefully distinguish between (a) the 
claim that the premises of an argument that denies the anteced-
ent, if true, lend some probabilistic support to its conclusion, and 
(b) the claim that the premises of an argument that denies the 
antecedent, if true, make the conclusion more likely to be true 
than false. He uses the same phrases—the adverb “probably”, or 
expressions like “inductive strength”—to make claims of both 
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kinds.11 This ambiguity may give his proposal some superficial 
appeal; if by saying that denying the antecedent has “inductive 
strength” one means only the former claim, then one might per-
haps grant that Argument 2 has some “inductive strength”. But 
that would not tell us that the argument establishes its conclu-
sion as “probably” true. In order to know that, we would need to 
know something else: something that is not settled by the fact 
that the premises of Argument 2 are both true. We would need to 
know how likely it is that the conclusion is true if capital pun-
ishment does not deter murder; and this is something that turns, 
as we saw, on the higher or lower probability that there are other 
sufficient conditions for justifying capital punishment that are 
satisfied. So we would need to add this information to our prem-
ises set; and then—again—the conditional premise could simply 
be discarded, and we would be left with something like Argu-
ment 6 above. 
The flaws in Stone’s analyses become particularly vivid 
when he proposes to consider a couple of “significant examples” 
which he thinks “clearly fit the argumentative context in which 
we have established that denying the antecedent has a legitimate 
role” (p. 350). One example is taken from a book by James 
Rachels (1990). Stone discusses a passage in which Rachels 
“argues that Darwinism undermines traditional morality by un-
dermining the idea of human dignity” (Stone 2012, p. 351): 
 
Rachel’s argument that Darwinism undermines the idea 
of human dignity attacks two main doctrines that are pre-
sented as support for the idea that human beings have 
moral dignity: (1) the view that humans are made in the 
image of God and (2) the view that human beings are 
uniquely rational. The way he applies this reasoning to 
his main argument is worth quoting in full:  
 
We are now in a position to explain how Darwin-
ism might undermine traditional morality. The 
claim that Darwinism undermines traditional mo-
rality is not the claim that it entails that the doc-
trine of human dignity is false. It is, instead, the 
claim that Darwinism provides reason for doubting 
the truth of the considerations that support the doc-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For example, when commenting on a variant of Floridi’s case “of a student 
[Maggie] reasoning about her chances of success on a test”—a case we dis-
cussed in Section 2.2—Stone writes: “Since on average students who study 
some pass the test, [Maggie’s] reasoning provides support for the conclusion 
. . . it is still reasonable for Maggie to draw the conclusion she does. In other 
words, the argument has inductive strength” (Stone 2014, p. 347, emphasis 
added). 
Denying the Antecedent 
 
 
© Duarte d’Almeida, MacDonald. Informal Logic, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2016), pp. 26-63. 
57 
trine. From a Darwinian perspective, both the im-
age of God thesis and the rationality thesis are sus-
pect. Moreover, there are good Darwinian reasons 
for thinking it unlikely that any other support for 
human dignity can be found. Thus, Darwinism fur-
nishes the “new information” that undermines hu-
man dignity by taking away its support. (Rachels 
1990: 97-98) 
 
Stone says that (p. 351): 
 
[t]he arguments that Rachels attacks depend on two con-
ditionals: “If human beings are created in the image of 
God, then human beings have moral dignity”, and “If 
human beings are uniquely rational, then human beings 
have moral dignity”. The arguments that Rachels uses to 
undermine the notion of human dignity involve denying 
the antecedent of these conditionals.  
 
So he attributes two arguments to Rachels. One is an argument 
against the image-of-God argument for moral dignity (Stone 
2012, p. 351): 
 
(1) If human beings are created in the image of God, then 
  human beings have moral dignity. 
(2) But human beings are not created in the image of God 
  (as Darwinism has shown). 
  Therefore, 
(3) Probably human beings do not have moral dignity. 
 
The other is an argument against the unique rationality argu-
ment: 
 
(1) If human beings are uniquely rational, then human be
  ings have moral dignity. 
(2) But human beings are not uniquely rational (as Dar
  winism has shown). 
  Therefore, 
(3) Probably human beings do not have moral dignity. 
 
But Stone gets Rachels’s argument doubly wrong as well. First, 
he saddles Rachels with a commitment to the two conditionals: 
in Stone’s reconstruction, the conditionals feature as an integral 
part of Rachels’s arguments. Yet these are Rachels’s opponents’ 
rather than his own conditionals; and clearly Rachels’s strategy 
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of denying the antecedent of such conditionals does not in the 
least commit him to accepting the conditionals themselves.12 
Second, Stone’s reconstruction omits a crucial step of 
Rachels’s argument, indeed one that is explicitly adopted in the 
very excerpt by Rachels that Stone quotes. Rachels does not 
merely argue that “from a Darwinian perspective, both the im-
age of God thesis and the rationality thesis are suspect”. He im-
mediately adds that “moreover, there are good Darwinian rea-
sons for thinking it unlikely that any other support for human 
dignity can be found.” This step is needed for the argument to 
run; and—again—as soon as we add this premise to the argu-
ments the conditional premises can be dispensed with (unsur-
prisingly, given that Rachels did not endorse them), and the re-
sulting arguments are deductively valid. Indeed we can recon-
struct everything as one single valid argument: 
 
(1) Human beings are not created in the image of God (as 
  Darwinism has shown). 
(2) Human beings are not uniquely rational (as Darwin
  ism has shown). 
(3) If human beings are neither created in the image of 
  God nor uniquely rational, then probably human be
  ings do not have moral dignity (for Darwinism has 
  shown that it is unlikely that any other support for 
  moral dignity can be found). 
  Therefore (from (1), (2) and (3)), 
(4) Probably human beings do not have moral dignity. 
 
The other example Stone discusses is an argument by John 
Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, against 
“the claim that some ideas or principles are innate” (Stone 2014, 
p. 353): 
 
The main argument that Locke attacks is that universal 
consent about principles proves them innate. “There is 
nothing more commonly taken for granted”, Locke ex-
plains, 
 
than that there are certain Principles both Specula-
tive and Practical (for they speak of both) univer-
sally agreed upon by all Mankind: which therefore, 
they argue, must needs be the constant Impres-
sions, which the Souls of Men receive in their first 
Beings, and which they bring into the World with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See also note 7 above. 
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them, as necessarily and really as they do any of 
their inherent faculties. (Locke 1975: 49) 
 
Part of Locke’s argument against these innate principles 
aims to undermine the position that there are innate prin-
ciples by taking away its support. Locke declares that 
“this Argument of Universal Consent, which is made use 
of, to prove innate Principles, seems to me a Demonstra-
tion that there are none such: Because there are none to 
which all Mankind give an Universal Assent” (Locke 
1975/1689: 49). 
 
Stone thinks that Locke’s “argument is correctly represented as 
an example of denying the antecedent” (Stone 2014, p. 353): 
 
(1) If there are principles that have universal agreement, 
  then these principles must be innate. 
(2) But there are no principles that have universal agree
  ment. 
  Therefore, 
(3) These principles are not innate. 
 
Stone downplays Locke’s explicit claim that he takes this to be a 
“demonstration” that there are no innate principles, and thinks 
this should be read as simply an attempt to “undermine” his op-
ponents’ arguments. This is highly unpersuasive; Locke does 
appear to be denying the antecedent of the conditional in order 
to (fallaciously) derive the negation of its consequent (in much 
the same way as Russell and Cohen in the arguments we dis-
cussed at the end in Section 1). Is there a way of avoiding attrib-
uting the formal fallacy to Locke? In his book Locke on Human 
Understanding, E. J. Lowe suggests one. “On the face of it”, 
Lowe writes, Locke’s argument “is a blatant example of denying 
the antecedent” (Lowe 1995, p. 24): 
 
The innatist, Locke has suggested, makes the following 
claim: 
 
1. If any principle is universally assented to, then it is in-
nate. 
 
The innatist then allegedly conjoins 1 with the claim that 
certain principles are universally assented to, and validly 
draws the conclusion that those principles are innate. But 
Locke himself now denies the antecedent of 1 by assert-
ing: 
 
2. No principle is universally assented to; 
Duarte d’Almeida, MacDonald 
 
 
© Duarte d’Almeida, MacDonald. Informal Logic, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2016), pp. 26-63. 
60 
and concludes thence 
 
3. No principle is innate. 
 
But 1 and 2 do not entail 3. (To suppose that they do is 
precisely to commit the fallacy of “denying the anteced-
ent”.) What is needed in conjunction with 2 to entail 3 is, 
rather, 
4. If any principle is innate, then it is universally assented 
to. 
 
“However”, as Lowe goes on to say (p. 25), “a justification of 
Locke’s strategy may be forthcoming if we take him to suppose 
that the innatist has and can have nothing other than universal 
assent to offer in support of the existence of innate principles”. 
Under this reading, then, Locke’s argument is not fallacious; it 
is to be reconstructed instead as: 
 
(1) No principle is universally assented to. 
(2) There is no other possible basis (that is, no basis other 
  than universal assent) for the existence of innate prin
  ciples. 
  Therefore (from (1) and (2)),  
(3) No principle is innate. 
 
This is the same kind of reconstruction we offered both for the 
capital punishment example (Argument 6 above) and for 
Rachels’s Darwinist argument. (The only difference is that here 
the second premise affirms that it is certain, rather than just like-
ly, that there is no other basis on which the opposite conclusion 
could be supported.) Whether or not Lowe’s reading of the ar-
gument is warranted is a question of Lockean exegesis that we 
do not have to adjudicate. What matters is that of the two com-
peting reconstructions of Locke’s argument, none matches 
Stone’s analysis. For the reconstruction above is a deductively 
valid argument having nothing to do with denying the anteced-
ent; and the alternative reading is that Locke did deny the ante-
cedent (of his opponents’ conditional) seeking to derive the ne-
gation of the consequent: but then he did commit the formal fal-
lacy. 
 
 
3.  Conclusion 
 
This paper offered discussions of several recent treatments of 
the fallacy of denying the antecedent. In Section 1, we argued 
that Burke’s interpretative approach does not, contrary to what 
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he claims, give us reason to think that the fallacy is seldom if 
ever committed in print. Our discussion was not targeted at the 
interpretative approach itself, on which we have endorsed no 
strong views. Rather, our argument was that the interpretative 
approach should not be tied to the assumption that passages that 
can charitably be said to commit the fallacy must instantiate 
what Burke calls a “B pattern”. Once that questionable assump-
tion is discarded, Burke’s claim that the fallacy is rarely com-
mitted is no longer supported. There are, moreover, we also ar-
gued, positive reasons to think that Burke’s claim is actually 
false. 
In Section 2, which was mostly critical in both purpose and 
tone, we discussed three recent attempts to rehabilitate the falla-
cy of denying the antecedent: Godden and Walton’s claim to 
have identified non-fallacious uses of “what is typically classi-
fied as formal fallacy of argument!”; Floridi’s claim that the 
formal fallacies are “informational shortcuts that can be epis-
temically fruitful”; and Stone’s claim that denying the anteced-
ent has “inductive strength” and is not “simply a formal fallacy 
that should be discarded”. We argued that none of these claims 
is warranted. Again, our strategy was not to offer comprehensive 
indictments of these authors’ broader accounts of fallacies, ar-
gumentative dialogues, burdens of proof, and so on.  Indeed, on 
many aspects of such accounts we have simply remained agnos-
tic. What we did target was the attention-grabbing claim, made 
on different grounds by each of those authors, that their accounts 
pose an interesting or illuminating challenge to the orthodox 
view of the formal fallacies. In our view, they do not. 
After all, in order to establish that there are legitimate in-
stances of “what is typically classified as a formal fallacy of ar-
gument” (to use Godden and Walton’s phrase again), those au-
thors would have to have shown that there can be arguments—
apart from those that happen to be materially valid by virtue of 
the meaning of the terms occurring in the premises—that (a) are 
cogent, and (b) do not rely for their cogency on further assump-
tions or premises (or changes to the conclusion) beyond those of 
the denying the antecedent pattern. Stone’s examples fail to 
meet condition (a), while Godden and Walton’s and Floridi’s 
fail to meet condition (b). But arguments that fail to meet the 
former are not aptly called “legitimate”, and those that fail to 
meet the latter are not instances of denying the antecedent. 
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